Freefall: The Crash of Pan American Airways
Pan
American Airways, or Pan Am for short; was America's premier international
airline from the early 1930s until the early 1980s. The airline went from the gold standard in
service and innovation to bankruptcy in only two decades. This was due to a litany events, some of
which were beyond its control and some of which were self-inflicted. To understand the failure of Pan Am, one must
know the history of its development. The
other things one must know are how both its leadership and its relationship with
the government changed over time.
In
1920 a German airline named SCADTA began operating in Colombia. Several American army officers (to include future
commander of the Air Force Henry 'Hap' Arnold) grew concerned that this may be
a future threat to the Panama Canal. In
1927 they created a shell company, Pan American Airways, to create a counter
operation to SCADTA. They were able to
secure the air mail route form Key west, FL to Havana, Cuba but were not able
to raise funds to equip the operation.
This is where Juan Trippe, a former naval aviator with ambitious plans, stepped
in.
The
well financed Trippe had already formed the Aviation Corporation of the
Americas which had Cuban landing rights.
He merged it with Pan American Airways and assumed their airmail
contracts to Cuba. With a rented float
plane, Pan Am completed their first Key West to Havana mail run as required by
October 19, 1927 (Millbrooke, A. 2006). The
American government saw this as a counter to SCADTA and gave quick approval to
Pan Am's rapid growth in South America (Gandt, 2012). Pan Am was on its way.
With
support from the United States government and adequate financing, Pan Am
quickly grew throughout South America.
It began operating out of Dinner Key near Miami, Florida and opened a
world class training facility there as well.
Trippe hired the best and most famous pilots he could to pioneer
routes. Charles Lindbergh and Ed Musick were
among them. This worked to both
establish new routes and promote the airline. He also acquired larger and more
capable aircraft. By 1935 Pan Am had bases
at Midway atoll, Wake island and Guam. Called
Clippers, these planes flew routes that extended to the Philippines by the end
of 1935. Pioneering of the north
Atlantic began in 1937 and later that same year Juan Trippe accepted the
Collier Trophy from President Roosevelt on behalf of Pan Am.
In
1939 Pan Am accepted six large Boeing 314 flying boats and in 1940 they also began
using the first pressurized airliner, the Boeing 307 Stratoliner. With World War II looming, the planes would soon
be taken for military service. Pan Am volunteered
to be completely subservient to the military for the duration of the war. Its training facility at Dinner Key was used to
train large numbers of military aviators in the science of long range flight
operations. During the war, Pan Am would
expand its routes across the middle east and Asia as part of its duties to the
military but would also gain valuable experience and contacts in the region.
Following
World War II, Pan Am would resume operations but things had changed for the
airlines. The war had littered the world
with large airports and good runways.
The advancement in transport aircraft was substantial so Pan Am, like
most airlines, shifted its fleet from flying boats to the newer, more
efficient, long ranged land planes. The
last scheduled flying boat service for Pan Am was completed in 1946.
Pan
Am returned to a premiere airline status and continued to innovate. It acquired new Boeing 377s and Douglas DC-4s. What Pan Am could not acquire were domestic
routes inside the U.S.. Pan Am was seen
as an unofficial representative of the United States. In fact, it was jokingly referred to as part
of the U. S. State Department (Gellene,
D., Dallos, R. 1991).
Competing
carriers successfully argued to the Civil Aeronautic Boards (CAB) that Pan Am,
with its worldwide network, would have an a virtual monopoly if it was allowed
a domestic route structure as well. The
CAB instead handed international routes to other U.S. airlines that had vast
domestic networks. Pan Am was also
having to compete with improving equipment. TWA ordered Lockheed Constellations
in 1946 so Pan Am was forced to do the same or lose its competitive edge in the
Atlantic but Pan Am had one advantage in Europe. Post WW2 Berlin was prohibited from having service
by a German airline so Pan Am got the job (Gandt, 2012).
1950
was a year of change for Pan Am. In
January they officially rebranded the airline as Pan American World Airways
(PAWA) but the public still referred to it as Pan Am. In September they also acquired American Overseas
Airlines for $17.45 million dollars and bought 45 DC-6Bs in the same
month. In 1956 they bought DC-7Cs to
keep up with TWA's improving line of Lockheed aircraft. This helped Pan Am to maintain parity with
TWA until 1957.
Juan
Trippe had foreseen the end of piston engine airliners and he was not idle. In 1955 Trippe met with Boeing about
acquiring 21 of the new Boeing jets. He
also gained leverage over Boeing by ordering 25 Douglas DC-8s as well. This gave Trippe the leverage to have Boeing
design a second version of the 707, the 707-320, to Pan Am's specifications
(Gandt, 2012).
Pan
Am began jet service in October of 1958 ushering in the jet age in America with
a flight from New York to Paris. The
early 707s needed a fuel stop in Gander but by 1959 the 707-320 was making
non-stop flights both ways with profitable payloads. The DC-8s began non-stop European service in
1960. The total value of the combined aircraft
orders was $269 million dollars. As
impressive as that order was, Juan Trippe had yet grander plans. In 1965 he again approached Boeing, this time
with the idea for a massive airliner that would bring down the cost of overseas
travel to be within the reach of the common man. He teamed with Boeing to layout the idea for
a jumbo jet later to be called the 747.
Boeing had to build an entirely new factory to construct the behemoth
yet it still managed to be operational by 1970.
The $525 million dollar order would revolutionize air travel; and almost
bankrupted Pan Am.
President
Johnson was no friend of Pan Am. He preferred American and Braniff (both based in
his home state of Texas). Johnson even
overruled the CAB on occasion and gave routes to Braniff and American despite
CAB rulings that they should go to Pan Am.
Although not crippling to Pan Am, it was a harbinger of things to
come.
Juan
Trippe retired in 1968 and was followed by Harold Gray. Gray, who was terminally ill, only served as
CEO until 1969. Najeeb Halaby Jr. then
took over Pan Am until 1971. Neither man
was successful in getting Pan Am any domestic routes. When President Nixon came to office in 1969
Pan Am expected to have Johnson's decision reversed but Nixon, after noting that
Pan Am was not on his donor list, elected to leave Johnson's decision intact. The government that had been so good to Pan
Am in its formative years was now seemingly intent on holding it back or at
least ambivalent.
In
1971 former Air Force brigadier General William Seawell would become CEO of Pan
Am. Where Trippe had been famous for his
building of relationships with business partners and governments, Seawell was quick
tempered and ruthless. He was seen more
as airplane operator than a visionary. Just
as with previous CEOs, Seawell was also unable to obtain domestic routes for Pan
Am. The airline's financial situation
was beginning to weaken in the face of increased competition from carriers who
had strong domestic networks as well as an increasing international presence. Despite this, Pan Am's international
dominance was still seen as a justification for the CAB to deny them domestic
routes. Pan Am still managed to flourish
and 1969 was a record year with the company earning $89 million dollars.
But
by mid 1970 the company had lost over $30 million dollars in what was becoming a
recessionary economy. In 1973 there was
an oil embargo to the United States which exacerbated the existing economic recession. This was just after Pan Am had begun
operating many of its new 747 Jumbo jets.
With a decline in travel, the airline now had considerable overcapacity
and massive costs, both for the payments on and high direct operating expense
of the 747s.
The
airline had accumulated $364 million dollars in losses over the past decade and
had almost one billion dollars in debt.
By the mid 1970s it was looking at a possible bankruptcy. This forced
Seawell to reduce Pan Am's size by 25% and engage in harsh, but badly needed, austerity
measures. It took until 1977 for Pan Am to
return to profitability.
But
Pan Am's meager profits were muted by President Jimmy Carter denying Pan Am the
Atlanta to London route (UPI, 1977) and the Dallas to London route (API,
1977). However, on October 4, 1978, President Carter deregulated
the airline industry and Pan Am was finally free to pursue a domestic feed and
cease operations on unprofitable routes.
They immediately dropped some European routes and began looking at
either starting a domestic feed or buying a domestic carrier. Seawell decided to buy.
In
1980 Pan Am bought National Airlines for $437 million after a bidding war with
Frank Lorenzo of Texas Air and Frank Borman of Eastern airlines. He had been warned by many at Pan Am that he
was paying too much. At the same time
Pan Am was being hit by expanding low cost competition and declining passenger
travel.
Pan
Am's debt topped one billion dollars and it was forced to divest itself of one
of its most famous non-core assets, the Pan Am building in Manhattan. It sold for $400 million. This only helped offset the financial burden temporarily
as the operating losses for 1980 were $248 million (Gandt, 2012). Part of this loss was because National
Airlines had a very different fleet and corporate culture than Pan Am. In addition, the National route structure did
little to help feed Pan Am's international route structure. Also, National employees were brought up to
Pan Am pay scales (Gandt, 2012).
In
1981 Chairman Seawell was replaced by former Braniff executive and Air Florida
CEO C. Edward Acker. Acker constantly
tinkered with the routes and kept changing corporate strategy back and forth
between domestic and international emphasis.
Under his management Pan Am was losing record amounts of money, nearly
half a billion dollars by the end of 1982 (Gandt, 2012).
In 1984 Acker proceeded with a fleet modernization program which included buying the new Airbus A-300/310. These planes replaced some of the older Boeing 727s and 747s once the ETOPS certification was approved by the FAA. Despite this they still had a large number of incompatible aircraft as a result of the National Airlines purchase. This situation was partly rectified in April of 1985 when Acker sold Pan Am's Pacific operations to United airlines for $750 million dollars. United also took the mismatched fleet types but this sale represented a quarter of Pan Am's route system (Petzinger, 1996).
In 1984 Acker proceeded with a fleet modernization program which included buying the new Airbus A-300/310. These planes replaced some of the older Boeing 727s and 747s once the ETOPS certification was approved by the FAA. Despite this they still had a large number of incompatible aircraft as a result of the National Airlines purchase. This situation was partly rectified in April of 1985 when Acker sold Pan Am's Pacific operations to United airlines for $750 million dollars. United also took the mismatched fleet types but this sale represented a quarter of Pan Am's route system (Petzinger, 1996).
In
1986 Pan Am acquired the Eastern Shuttle and several regional feeder airlines. The shuttle was profitable and Pan An held on
to it until their last year of operation but it never had an impact on the
international feed. In January of 1988 Acker
was replaced by Thomas Plaskett as the CEO of Pan Am and immediately set to improve
the airlines appearance and on time performance. The now much smaller airline had just begun to
have profitable quarters again when it became a victim of its own brand.
Pan
Am was still seen as America's international airline and as such became a target
for terrorists. On December 4th of 1988,
Pan Am flight 103 was destroyed over Lockerbie Scotland by a bomb (Kane, 2012). This set in motion a series of events that
Pan Am could not recover from. One of
the worst effects was the shattering of public confidence in the airline. There was near constant television coverage
broadcasting of the cockpit wreckage which clearly displayed Pan Am's paint
scheme and the Clipper name.
Following
this, passengers simply would not fly on Pan Am out of fear. It also slowed international travel which
only compounded Pan Am's situation. From
this point on Pan Am was selling assets to stay in the air and the financial
decline following Lockerbie was to prove terminal.
In
1989 Pan Am tried to recover its position by merging with Northwest Airlines
but the merger never took place as Pan Am was outbid (Petzinger, 1996). In August of 1990 the first Gulf War
began. This resulted in a plunge in
transatlantic travel which hit Pan Am's bottom line even harder. Also, the Berlin Wall had fallen and the
result was that Germany no longer needed a foreign airline to fly its routes to
Berlin. Pan Am sold its internal German
route system to Lufthansa for $150 million dollars and reduced its workforce by
another 9% (Gandt, 2012). This was not
enough to reverse Pan Am's losses and in January of 1991 Pan Am declared
bankruptcy.
Delta
Airlines bought Pan Am's Atlantic routes and became a 45% owner for $416
million dollars plus a $100 million dollar cash infusion. The remaining 55% of Pan Am was controlled by
the Pan Am Creditors Committee (PACC).
In
October of 1991 former Douglas Aircraft Company executive Russell Ray Jr. was
hired as Pan Am's CEO (Sanchez, 1991). Pan
Am was to move their headquarters to Miami and become a primarily Caribbean
carrier. Downscaled to 60 airplanes and
7,500 employees Pan Am's only remaining transatlantic routes were Miami to London
and Paris CEO Ray and the PACC to soon found themselves at odds. Ray was seen by Pan Am employees and the PACC
as "Delta's man". Ray and
Delta saw that even after the restructuring Pan Am was losing over $2 million
dollars per day (Petzinger, 1996).
Delta
was to give Pan Am a $25 million dollar cash infusion following Thanksgiving in
1991 but at the last minute withheld that payment (Gandt, 2012). Delta claimed that it did not see how Pan Am
could become viable. Pan Am employees
felt that Delta had picked off the best assets of Pan Am and cut the remainder
loose. Since Pan Am needed $15 million
dollars just to operate for another week, the airline was effectively broke. Ray was left with no option and on the
evening of December 3rd he gave a three word command that effectively ended Pan
Am's 64 year history; "Shut it down".
On Dec. 4th, 1991, flight 436 from Barbados to Miami was Pan Am's final
flight. Upon its parking at the gate,
Pan Am ceased to exist as an airline.
In conclusion, the
failure of Pan Am has many reasons but there are four key events that sealed
its fate. First were the changing government
policies from just after World War Two up through deregulation. Secondly was the 1973 oil embargo and its
resulting weakening of Pan Am's finances.
Thirdly was the inept merger with National Airlines. The fourth and fatal blow was the terrorist
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. After the Lockerbie bombing Pan Am never saw financial
daylight again. The era of the premiere
carrier was over and the era of the cost effective airline was in.Juan Trippe and Charles Lindbergh in the early days of Pan Am |
The Pan Am Worldport at JFK in New York |
Low cost carriers such as Peoples Express became the new normal |
References
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09/business/fi-7339_1_united-airlines
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Kane, R. (2012) Air Transportation. Dubuque, IA: Kendall
Hunt
Krishnaiyer, K. (2013). Politics and the
Growth/Fall of Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) in Florida. Retrieved from this web link.
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http://thefloridasqueeze.com/2013/08/11/politics-and-the-growthfall-of-pan- american-world-
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Jeppesen
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Sanchez, J (1991). L.A. Executive Ray Gets Top Posts at Pan Am. Retrieved from this web link.
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http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-21/business/fi-2509_1_aerospace-executive
UPI (1977). Pan Am Chairman makes Pitch for Atlanta to
London Route. Retrieved
from this
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